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Government–opposition relations in Spain have been long characterised by a high level of
consensus and cooperation. The question analysed here is whether the economic crisis
initiated in 2008 has created unprecedented levels of conflict in the political system or
whether opposition parties have maintained a cooperative strategy oriented to influence
far-reaching policy decisions. Results illustrate that patterns of consensus have decreased
significantly since the outbreak of the crisis, and this is partly explained by the rising
amount of legislation with socio-economic content, variations in the government’s popu-
larity, and the type of government. The analysis also shows that the crisis has increased the
incentives of opposition parliamentary groups to oppose European Union legislation,
especially among left parties.
Keywords: parliamentary opposition; government type; government popularity; economic
crisis; Spain.
Introduction
Following the outbreak of the world financial crisis in 2008, the economic
situation in Spain changed dramatically. The economy, which until that time
had been enjoying moderate economic growth and government surplus, was
plunged into a deep economic recession, with rising levels of unemployment
and increasing public debt. In the wake of the recession and collapse of the coun-
try’s housing market, Jose´ Luı´s Rodrı´guez Zapatero’s socialist government
implemented severe austerity measures aimed at reducing state spending and lim-
iting the public sector deficit. Cutbacks in social welfare programmes, pension
and labour market reforms were implemented so the government failed to fulfil
an important part of its electoral promises. After the socialist electoral defeat
in 2011, Mariano Rajoy’s conservative government continued to implement pol-
icies to curb spending and to control the state deficit. The conservatives launched
a major reform of the labour market and financial system and raised taxes, contra-
dicting some of their ideological principles and electoral commitments. In adher-
ing to the recommendations of the EU and other international institutions and by
adopting these austerity plans, both governments assumed high political risks in
terms of re-election. Indeed, the measures implemented have given rise to
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considerable political controversy and social mobilisation in Spain, and to unpre-
cedented levels of criticism directed towards European institutions.
The question analysed here is the extent to which the economic crisis has
transformed government–opposition relations in Spain. As in other advanced
democracies, such as Italy (Cazzola, 1974; Di Palma, 1977), the UK (Rose,
1980), the US (Adler & Wilkerson, 2013; Rose, 1984) and Germany (Rose,
1984; Saalfeld, 1990), government–opposition relations in Spain are character-
ised by a high level of consensus and cooperation (Capo, 1994; Mu´jica &
Sa´nchez Cuenca, 2006). Yet to what extent has this consociational behaviour
been affected by changes to the social, political and economic context? Is govern-
ment–opposition consensus immune to the economic crisis? Or, on the contrary,
does the crisis represent an opportunity for opposition parties to undermine the
government’s position, creating unprecedented levels of conflict in the political
system? To answer these questions, the patterns of consensus in the Spanish par-
liament between 2001 and 2012 are examined, considering as explanatory vari-
ables the type of government (minority or majority), the socio-economic
content of legislation, fluctuations in the government’s popularity, and the
extent to which the legislative measures are defined by EU institutions. The
analysis is based on the final voting pattern for all organic laws and the validation
votes for all decree-laws passed in the Spanish parliament during this period.
The following section introduces the theoretical framework and the hypoth-
eses to be tested. The third section outlines the data and methodology used in
the analysis. The fourth section describes the changes in government–opposition
dynamics in Spain between 2001 and 2012. The fifth explains which variables
account for these changes and the last part summarises the main conclusions to
be drawn from the analysis.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Opposition behaviour is central to an understanding of the dynamics of represen-
tative democracies. Voting for or against policy decisions is informative about
partisan controversy and dissent, providing relevant information about the func-
tioning of democracy (Dahl, 1966; Hix, 2013). Despite this, most studies have
focused their attention on the analysis of the output of the legislative process
and the spatial location of political parties on policy issues, tending to neglect
the analysis of the opposition as a political actor (Mu´jica & Sa´nchez Cuenca,
2006; Parry, 1997). Scholars now have excellent exogenous measures of
spatial location of parties (Benoit & Laver, 2007; Klingemann, Volkens, Bara,
& Budge, 2006), but these analyses do not explain the extent to which these esti-
mated locations translate into revealed behaviour in the most important arena of
representative democracy (Petrocik, 1996; Poole, 2005).
A large set of studies analyses voting behaviour in parliaments by considering
political parties’ tactical choices based on two contrasting options: conflict or
cooperation. The adversarial model suggests that opposition parties adopt a
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distinct position from the party in office following a strategy based on conflict
(Rose, 1980). Partisanship is considered the driving force in politics, and opposi-
tion groups are supposed to behave tactically, emphasising disagreements and
confrontation in order to weaken the incumbent government and to gain office.
From this perspective, the more a party and its electorate assign relevance to
an issue, the more costly it will be to behave consensually (Cazzola, 1974;
De Giorgi, 2011; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Jenkins, 2010; Rose, 1984). Opposition
behaviour can be expected to be more in conflict on highly visible, politicised
issues affecting basic citizens’ rights, such as same-sex marriage or abortion,
and on economic and social issues, where parties represent different ideological
positions and socio-economic interests. For these issues it is hard to justify any
shift from the initial party position in the face of the electorate, which is liable
to generate conflict and confrontation that persists over time (Mu´jica &
Sa´nchez Cuenca, 2006).
By contrast, the consensual model suggests that parties agree on fundamental
issues and that opposition parliamentary groups cooperate with the government to
participate in important policy decisions. Parties are in opposition as they are out
of government, but they are not necessarily in constant disagreement with the
government (Norton, 2008). The parliament is considered a venue for expressing
partisan or ideological divisions but it is also an operational governing body
oriented to solving problems (Adler & Wilkerson, 2013). This means that parlia-
mentary representatives do not always view choices in purely partisan terms but
choose to cooperate on important issues that must be solved even at the risk of
suffering electoral consequences. On issues of national interest affecting the
whole electorate, such as defence or terrorism, consensus is expected to be
high and a problem-solving perspective more likely (Adler & Wilkerson, 2013;
Rose, 1984).
As Moury and De Giorgi (2014) argue in the Introduction to this comparative
work, because of the characteristics of the actual economic crisis, the dilemma
between opting for conflict or cooperation has become particularly acute. In
line with the consensual model, in a context of severe economic crisis, opposition
parties tend to maintain and even strengthen the pattern of cooperative relations
with the government in order to influence far-reaching policy decisions on econ-
omic and social issues (Adler & Wilkerson, 2013). By contrast, the adversarial
model suggests that in a context of economic crisis voters are more likely to with-
draw support from the incumbent government, increasing the opposition’s incen-
tive to mobilise popular discontent using a strategy based on conflict (Lewis-
Beck, 1988). That is, the economic crisis provides a unique opportunity for oppo-
sition political parties to weaken the incumbent government, increasing their
possibility of winning power at the next elections. Accordingly, the first hypoth-
esis can be defined as follows:
H1: If the adversarial model holds true, government–opposition relations
in Spain should have become increasingly controversial, especially
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regarding socio-economic issues; by contrast, if the consensual hypothesis
holds true, government–opposition relations should have maintained their
traditional character based on consensus.
Parliamentary behaviour is shaped, to a large extent, by formal institutions and
the type of government (see, for example, Cazzola, 1974; Dahl, 1966; Duverger,
1951; Hix, 2013; Mu´jica & Sa´nchez Cuenca, 2006; Pasquino, 1995; Sartori,
1966). In general, it is expected that governments have fewer incentives to
seek agreement with opposition parties when they hold a majority of seats. In
Spain, this was the case of the governments of the Partido Popular (PP) from
2000 to 2004 (with Jose´ Maria Aznar as president of the government) and
from 2011 to the present (under Mariano Rajoy). Consensus becomes more
likely with minority governments, mainly because the incumbent needs the
support of other parties to pass the budget and legislation. For the period analysed
here, this was the case of Zapatero’s socialist government (PSOE),1 which always
governed in a minority (from 2004 to 2011). During the first legislature (2004–
8), the PSOE headed a minority government with the support of the far left
(Izquierda Unida [IU] and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds [ICV]) and Esquerra
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), while after 2008 this formal, stable support
was diluted into specific and punctual alliances with left and regional political
parties. Accordingly, the second hypothesis can be defined as follows:
H2: During minority governments, consensus is higher than under majority
governments.
In line with Moury and De Giorgi, government–opposition dynamics are strongly
related to the government’s popularity and the risk of electoral defeat. An exten-
sive body of research has reported that crisis conditions tend to undermine citi-
zens’ support for incumbents (Browne, Frendreis, & Gleiber, 1986; Diamond,
Linz, & Lipset, 1989). The magnitude of the electoral impact is correlated with
the depth of the crisis experienced in the pre-electoral period measured in terms
of variations in exchange rates, gross domestic product (GDP) and/or inflation
(Remmer, 1991). In this context, the incentives for the opposition parties to
attack the government and to engage in a more adversarial strategy increase as
they set about undermining the already low popularity of the government.
In 2008, following Zapatero’s re-election, 21 per cent of citizens considered
the government’s performance to be ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’, while four years later, at
the end of the legislature, this percentage had risen to 58 per cent. Similarly, the
government’s popularity declined constantly after the PP won the 2011 general
elections, with 66 per cent of Spanish citizens expressing their disapproval of
government reforms in 2013 (CIS Barometer, 2013). These falling levels of gov-
ernment popularity are strongly related to the economic crisis ushered in around
2008, characterised by unprecedented levels of complexity and intensity (Bar-
reiro, 2011; Ortega & Pen˜alosa, 2012; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). Unemployment
rates have risen more than 15 per cent since the beginning of the crisis, from 9 per
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cent of the workforce in 2007 to 22 per cent in 2011 and 27 per cent in 2013. The
Spanish economy entered recession in 2009, with a 4 per cent negative growth
rate, while rising public and private debt levels led to a serious sovereign debt
crisis. This poor economic performance and the social consequences of the
policy measures adopted to combat the crisis seriously undermined the popularity
of incumbent governments. As a result, the third hypothesis can be defined as
follows:
H3: Parliamentary consensus falls as the popularity of the incumbent
decreases.
Finally, the present economic crisis, in contrast to previous ones, is characterised
by the fact that it is being managed in a context of multilevel governance, where
most economic policy instruments are in the hands of EU institutions (Hooghe &
Marks, 2001). The delegation of decision-making powers to the EU and the cre-
ation of European monetary union have meant that most policy measures
implemented to overcome the crisis have been prescribed or recommended by
external actors. The reform of the Spanish Constitution to cap budget deficit in
2011, the reform of the pension system in 2011 or the provision of rescue
loans to the Spanish banks in 2012 are some examples. Existing research has ana-
lysed extensively the importance of the strategic interaction between political
parties in an attempt to understand the impact of Europe on domestic policies,
considering both the role of EU-sceptical extreme parties (Hooghe & Marks,
2009; Kriesi et al., 2008) and the incentives for mainstream political parties to
politicise EU issues (Green-Pedersen, 2012). It is argued that pro-European main-
stream parties are more likely to cooperate with the incumbent government when
policies adopted at the domestic level adhere to EU recommendations. By con-
trast, Eurosceptic parties have few incentives to collaborate with the incumbent
government, especially in relation to highly Europeanised issues (Hooghe,
Marks, & Wilson, 2004; Sitter, 2001, 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003).
Party positions on European integration influence the politicisation of EU
affairs but formal rules also affect to what extent they are the object of parliamen-
tary debates (Bergman & Damgaard, 2000; Karlas, 2012; Raunio, 2005; Strøm,
Mu¨ller, & Bergman, 2003; Winzen, 2012). In the case of Spain, the parliament
plays only a marginal role in relation to EU affairs (it being the executive that
intervenes in the agenda-setting and decision-making process) and just a small
percentage of directives are finally debated in the Congreso de los Diputados
(Palau & Chaque´s-Bonafont, 2012). Moreover, there are no Eurosceptic
parties. No political party has questioned Spanish membership of the EU and
public opinion has historically been supportive and enthusiastic of Europeanisa-
tion (Closa, 1995; Dı´ez Medrano, 2003, 2007; Sa´nchez, 1999; Szmolka, 1999).
Accordingly, the fourth and final hypothesis can be defined as follows:
H4: Government and opposition are more likely to collaborate on
EU-related issues than they are on domestic affairs.
GOVERNMENT – OPPOSITION DYNAMICS IN SPAIN 5
Data and Methodology
This analysis of government–opposition dynamics draws on a database created
by the Spanish Policy Agendas Project2 containing information about the final
voting patterns for all the organic laws and the validation votes for all the
decree-laws passed by the Spanish parliament between 2001 and 2012. A total
of 104 organic laws and 169 decree-laws are analysed and coded. The approval
of organic laws requires an absolute majority in Congress and they are limited to
the regulation of certain issues, these being the exercise of fundamental rights and
public liberties, the general electoral system, the approval of regional statutes
(Estatutos de Autonomı´a), and other procedures considered in the Spanish Con-
stitution, including the regulation of the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman
(Defensor del Pueblo) and the states of alert, emergency or siege. Organic
laws represent 13 per cent of all the laws passed in Spain in the period 2001–12.
Decree-laws are provisional regulatory acts passed by the executive in case of
extraordinary or urgent necessity, or when exceptional circumstances impede the
implementation of ordinary legislative procedures. In accordance with the
Spanish Constitution, decree-laws cannot affect the regulation of basic state insti-
tutions, rights, duties, and liberties of citizens, the Estatutos de Autonomı´a, or the
general electoral system. Decree-laws have to be submitted for debate and voting
by the entire Congress within 30 days of their promulgation. The Congress has to
adopt a specific decision on their ratification or revocation in the same period,
with the option of processing them as executive bills. Decree laws represent 22
per cent of all the laws passed in Spain in the period 2001–12.
The database contains information about the total number of votes and the
specific votes cast by each parliamentary group (positive, negative, abstentions
and absences). Data about the total number of votes are available on the
Spanish Congress webpage (www.congreso.es), while information concerning
the voting behaviour of each parliamentary group is available only on request
and for the period 2001–12,3 which is why this analysis was circumscribed to
this period. This database draws on those previously created by the Spanish
Policy Agendas Project, which provide information about the specific issue
addressed by the legislative measure, the legislature, year, month, title, author
of the initiative, and the EU content of organic laws and decree-laws
(Chaque´s-Bonafont, Palau, & Baumgartner, forthcoming; Chaque´s-Bonafont,
Palau, & Mun˜oz, 2014). Legislation is considered to be Europeanised if it is
totally or partially defined by an EU-binding regulatory act (Brouard, Costa, &
Ko¨ning, 2011; Palau & Chaque´s-Bonafont, 2012).
The level of conflict and consensus is measured using the index developed by
Capo (1994). This index of consensus is based on the following formula:
IC = vf
n∗v/N
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where vf corresponds to the total number of positive votes cast for a law, n is
the number of deputies in the governing party, v is the total number of votes,
including positive and negative votes as well as abstentions, and N is the size
of the assembly (350). The index can be interpreted as follows: if the index
has a value of one, the incumbent party does not obtain support from any other
parliamentary group; whereas if the index has a value greater than one, the
incumbent obtains support from other groups: the more support it receives, the
higher the value.
To analyse the impact of minority–majority governments, in line with Mu´jica
and Sa´nchez Cuenca (2006), the difference in the number of seats between the
incumbent and the main opposition party is taken into account. The analysis of
the impact of legislative issue type draws on the 19 topics identified by the Com-
parative Agendas Project. A dummy, with a value of one if the legislation is
related to topic 1 (economy), 3 (health), 5 (labour), 6 (education), 13 (social
policy), and 15 (commerce and banking) and zero otherwise,4 is used to deter-
mine whether socio-economic measures are more open to conflict than other
issues. Finally,5 government’s popularity is measured in accordance with the bar-
ometer published by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociolo´gicas (http://www.cis.
es) and, more specifically, according to the responses given to the following ques-
tion: How do you evaluate the government’s performance: very good, good, bad,
very bad?
Government–Opposition Dynamics in Spain
Previous analysis of government–opposition dynamics based on the analysis of
organic laws (Mu´jica & Sa´nchez Cuenca, 2006) illustrates that consensus has
been the dominant pattern in Spanish politics. During the country’s first legisla-
ture, in the transition to democracy, 97 per cent of organic laws were passed with
a positive vote from the main opposition party. This percentage subsequently fell
to 44 per cent during Felipe Gonza´lez’s first term in office (1982–86), when the
socialists enjoyed an absolute majority. It then rose again during the minority
governments of Felipe Gonza´lez (1993–96) and Jose´ Maria Aznar (1996–
2000), when the percentage reached 76 and 77 per cent, respectively. Overall,
between 1979 and 2001, the government and the main opposition party were in
agreement on 71 per cent of the organic laws passed in the Spanish parliament.
This pattern was reversed between 2001 and 2012. The consensus declined
during Jose´ Maria Aznar’s majority government (PP), when 61 per cent of
organic laws were passed with a positive vote from the main opposition party,
but also during Zapatero’s first minority government (PSOE), when the percen-
tage fell to 55 per cent. The latter rate can be explained by the controversial
policy reforms implemented by the socialists in areas such as education, immi-
gration or the disputed reform to the Catalan Statute introduced during this
period. The level of consensus rose again during the socialists’ second legislature
(to 69 per cent), when although conflict was high in relation to certain issues (for
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example, the reform of the abortion act), a significant number of organic laws
concerning issues on which party conflict is very low (for example, the ratifica-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty) were introduced. By contrast, the level of consensus
fell dramatically after 2011, with only 37 per cent of organic laws having been
passed with the support of the socialist party, the lowest level of consensus
since the transition to democracy. In the case of decree-laws,6 the level of con-
sensus rose during Zapatero’s first minority government (the percentage of
these laws passed with the support of the main opposition party increased from
55 per cent in the period 2001–4 to 64 per cent for the period 2004–8). After
2008, following the outbreak of the economic crisis, the level of consensus fell
to 43 per cent during Zapatero’s second legislature and to 28 per cent during
that of Rajoy (2011–12).
The index of consensus (Figure 1) and the mean percentage of positive and
negative votes (Figure 2) corroborate this decline in parliamentary consensus
over time, and especially since 2011, when the PP began to govern with an absol-
ute majority and important reform measures aimed at tackling the economic crisis
were passed. If a consideration is given to both organic laws and decree-laws, the
results show that the level of consensus was higher during the socialist legisla-
tures – the mean percentage of positive votes increased from 42 per cent
during Aznar’s absolute majority (2001–4) to 55 and 53 per cent during Zapa-
tero’s first and second legislatures, respectively. Consensus, however, declined
markedly in 2012, with Rajoy taking office, as the mean percentage of positive
votes fell from 53 to 26 per cent, while that of negative votes increased from
12 to 52 per cent.
As Table 1 illustrates, there has also been considerable variation in the voting
behaviour of parliamentary groups across legislatures. On the one hand, the two
main state-wide political parties – the PSOE and the PP – adopt different
Figure 1: Index of Consensus: Organic Laws and Decree-laws (2001–12)
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strategies: overall the PP gives more support to the incumbent political party than
is the case with the PSOE. The mean percentage of positive votes cast by the PP
during the two legislatures governed by the PSOE was 53 per cent. By contrast,
the mean percentage of positive votes cast by the PSOE between 2001 and 2004
Table 1: Mean Percentage of Positive and Negative Votes by Different Parliamentary Groups:
Organic Laws and Decree-laws (2001–12)
Legislature
Aznar Zapatero I Zapatero II Rajoy
(2001–4) (2004–8) (2008–11) (2011–12)
PSOE Yes 44.6 93.1 97.2 27.5
No 24.8 0.3 0.1 59.3
PP Yes 87.6 53.5 52.6 96.1
No 0.2 24.5 12.3 0.1
CIU Yes 65.2 71 65.7 49
No 5.9 4.9 1.4 27.9
PNV Yes 31.6 60.4 60 28.1
No 11 5 17.2 23.2
ERC Yes 70
No 5
IU∗ Yes 22.4 70.7 42.5 6.6
No 23.5 6.3 29.9 59.7




∗IU votes with ERC and ICV in the legislature 2008–11 and with ICV and Chunta Aragonesista in
2012.
Figure 2:Mean Percentage of Positive and Negatives Votes of Opposition Parliamentary Groups
over Time: Organic Laws and Decree-laws (2001–12)
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(during the Aznar government) was just 45 per cent. The decline in socialist
support for the incumbent party was even more marked during 2012, the first
year of the Rajoy government, when this percentage fell to 27 per cent. In fact,
this pattern is adhered to by all the opposition parties, in particular by the far-
left party Izquierda Unida. With a mean percentage of negative votes standing
at 60 per cent in 2012, this is the party that most fiercely opposes the PP govern-
ment, followed by the socialists (59 per cent) and UPyD (49 per cent). In the case
of the regional political parties, their opposition to government policies has also
increased in comparison with levels recorded in previous legislatures, albeit less
intensively than the opposition expressed by the other parliamentary groups. In
the case of CIU, the mean percentage of negative votes increased from 1 per
cent in Zapatero’s last legislature to 28 per cent in 2012. By contrast, the PNV
presented much greater opposition to the legislation introduced by the PSOE,
especially in the period 2008–11 (17 per cent). Yet, the mean percentage of nega-
tive votes of the PNV increased significantly with Rajoy in power (23 per cent).
Analysis and Results
To analyse the extent to which changes in the index of consensus can be
explained by the type of legislation under debate (that is, the socio-economic
content of the proposed measure), the type of government, variations in govern-
ment’s popularity and the degree of Europeanisation (whether the measure
involves EU-related legislation), an ordinary least squares regression (OLS)
regression was conducted (see the following equation). Differences between
the parliamentary groups were analysed using the same regression equation but
considering the mean percentage of positive votes cast by each group as the
dependent variable. In the case of the PP and the PSOE, the fact of their being
in office or in opposition was also taken into consideration.
IC = C + b1SocEcoIssues+ b2SeatDif + b3GovUnpop+ b4EUcontent + 1
where: IC ¼ Capo’s (1994) index of consensus for all organic laws and decree-
laws passed between 2001 and 2012; SocEcoIssues ¼ unity if organic laws and
decree-laws involve socio-economic issues, zero otherwise; SeatDif ¼ difference
in the number of seats between the government and the main party in opposition;
GovUnpop ¼ government’s unpopularity measured by the percentage of citizens
considering the government’s performance as being ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’; and
EUcontent ¼ unity if organic laws and decree-laws are totally or partially
defined by an EU binding regulatory act.
As Figure 3 illustrates, the amount of socio-economic legislation has
increased in recent years in parallel with the worsening of the economic crisis.
During Aznar’s last government (2001–4) and Zapatero’s first legislature
(2004–8), legislation tackling socio-economic issues accounted for 38 and 35
per cent of the total (considering both organic laws and decree-laws),
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respectively. Between 2008 and 2011, this percentage rose to 45 per cent, and in
2012, under Rajoy, it reached 65 per cent. This increase was especially high in the
case of decree-laws, which, since 2008, have accounted for 89 per cent of all
socio-economic legislation. The regression results (Table 2)7 show that the con-
sensus on socio-economic issues was lower than that on other issues – the index
of consensus fell by 0.2 when legislation involved socio-economic measures.
This variable is negative and statistically significant for all the opposition
groups (Table 3). Only when the PP and the PSOE are in office are they more
likely to give support to economic and social measures, because they initiate
legislation – 71 per cent of all organic laws and decree-laws were introduced
by the government.
Although the index of consensus on economic and social issues declined in
Zapatero’s second legislature and immediately after the PP took office, conflict
has always been higher in relation to socio-economic measures than in relation
to that of any other policy area (Figure 4). Moreover, following the outbreak
of the crisis, consensus declined in relation to all policy areas, not just in relation
to socio-economic measures. Overall, in relation to H1, these results demonstrate
that opposition parliamentary groups tend not to opt for a strategy based on
cooperation to tackle the crisis, nor do they adopt a problem-solving perspective.
On the contrary, conflict concerning socio-economic affairs has always been high
and it has increased since the outbreak of the crisis, and at present it is especially
marked since the PP won an absolute parliamentary majority at the 2011 general
elections.
Figure 3: Percentage of Socio-economic Legislation, Unemployment Rate, Variations in the
Popularity of the Government and Index of Consensus (2001–12)
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The regression results also illustrate that as the difference between the
number of seats held by the government and the main opposition party increases,
the index of consensus decreases. As Table 3 illustrates, this variable is statisti-
cally significant and the coefficient negative for all parliamentary groups – as the
difference in the number of seats increases, the mean percentage of positive votes
for legislation falls – with the exception of the PP, which presents a positive coef-
ficient because it always enjoyed an absolute majority during the period of analy-
sis (Figure 5).8 In the case of IU, support was higher in Zapatero’s first legislature
Table 2: OLS Regression Results: Variables Affecting the Index of Consensus







Note: p , 0.10; ∗p , 0.05; ∗∗p , 0.01; ∗∗∗p , 0.001.
Table 3: OLS Regression Results: Variables Affecting the Decision of Parliamentary Groups to









Content Intercept R-Square N
PSOE -8.115∗ -1.154∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 3.197 108.766 0.575 248
(0.02) (0.000) (0.000) (0.329)
PSOEGov 0.774 – 0.121∗∗∗ -0.504 90.89 0.239 146
(0.245) (0.000) (0.424)
PSOEOpo -22.098∗∗ – -0.232 7.112 51.383 0.1 102
(0.01) (0.312) (0.363)
PP -12.969∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.006 -6.45 47.528 0.267 248
(0.006) (0.000) (0.962) (0.142)
PPGov 2.281 – 0.206∗∗∗ -0.417 82.932 0.34 102
(0.075) (0.000) (0.724)
PPOpo -22.543∗∗ – 0.048 -9.926 62.711 0.077 146
(0.004) (0.833) (0.179)
CIU -12.828∗∗ -0.167+ -0.244+ -7.049 86.294 0.089 248
(0.008) (0.065) (0.076) (0.121)
PNV -13.84∗∗ -0.57∗∗∗ 0.012 3.081 71.337 0.137 248
(0.014) (0.000) (0.939) (0.561)
IU -13.375∗∗ -0.755∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗ -3.45 86.074 0.329 248
(0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.421)
Notes: We have only considered those groups with parliamentary representation during the whole
period under analysis (2001–12). For those parties that only have parliamentary group in one
legislature, such as ERC or UPyD, it is not possible to control for the impact of some variables in the
model, for example the type of government. In the case of IU, the parliamentary group includes ERC
and ICV in the legislature 2008–11 and ICV and Chunta Aragonesista in 2012.
+p , 0.10; ∗p , 0.05; ∗∗p , 0.01; ∗∗∗p , 0.001.
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as the socialists relied on the support of this party, as well as that of ERC, to
govern. Following the electoral reverse suffered by IU in the 2008 general elec-
tions, the mean percentage of positive votes of this group fell, initiating a period
of greater opposition to government legislation. Overall, these results corroborate
Figure 4: Index of Consensus (2001–12): Differences by Type of Legislation
Figure 5: Mean Percentage of Positive Votes for Legislation Considering Seats Difference and
Parliamentary Groups
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H2: the type of government significantly affects the pattern of consensus in the
Spanish parliament.
Changes in the popularity of the government also seem to affect the pattern of
consensus: as the percentage of the public that believes the government to be
doing a ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ job increases, the index of consensus falls. Given
that the likelihood of winning office is especially high in the case of the two
state-wide parties (the PP and the PSOE), it is particularly interesting to
analyse how changes in the popularity of the incumbent affect the voting behav-
iour of these two parties that have alternated in power over the last few decades in
Spain. The results show that as the popularity of the PP government falls, the
PSOE is less likely to give support to the incumbent government (a statistically
significant negative coefficient). This accounts for the high percentage of nega-
tive votes cast by the PSOE in relation to the legislation introduced by Rajoy,
especially regarding socio-economic legislation (Figure 6). By contrast, fluctu-
ations in the popularity of the Aznar government did not significantly affect
the voting behaviour of the PSOE in the period 2001–4, basically because the
popularity of the conservatives remained high, with the exception of the year
2003, coinciding with citizen discontent with Spain’s involvement in the Iraq
war (Figure 3).
In the case of the PP, by contrast, the regression results illustrate that when
this party is in opposition and the popularity of the PSOE is low, it is more
likely to vote in favour of legislation. But the coefficient is not statistically sig-
nificant. Moreover, although the positive coefficient could suggest that the PP
voting behaviour is designed to overcome the crisis by adopting a strategy of
cooperation, if the same regression is run considering only socio-economic legis-
lation, the coefficient becomes negative. As Figures 6 and 7 show, the PP gave
Figure 6: Mean Percentage of Positive Votes, Negative Votes and Abstentions of the PSOE to
Socio-economic Legislation
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more support to the socio-economic legislation passed by Zapatero designed to
tackle the crisis than the PSOE have given to date to the measures adopted by
Rajoy, although the PP basically adopted a strategy based on abstention: the
mean percentage of PP abstentions in votes on socio-economic legislation
increased from 9 per cent during Zapatero’s first legislature to 40 per cent in
his second term in office. The PP gave support to some of the measures intro-
duced by the PSOE to tackle the crisis, for example legislation designed to facili-
tate credit access for businesses and families, but in other important areas of
policymaking, such as the labour market reform of 2010 or the package of econ-
omic measures introduced in 2008 to promote economic activity, the PP
abstained.
A possible interpretation of this abstention is that the conservative party did
not want to give support to the measures passed by the socialists but neither did
they want to appear to be in disagreement with EU institutions, given that the
majority of these policies were introduced in line with EU recommendations.
The PP strategy therefore was that of not taking a public stance so as to maximise
utility in the eyes of voters and EU institutions, given the likelihood of their
winning office in the next elections.9 The analysis of PP abstentions shows that
during Zapatero’s second legislature the abstention rate was higher on EU-
related legislation (42 per cent) than it was on domestic measures (36 per
cent). As for the other parliamentary groups, CIU and IU present a regression
coefficient that is negative and statistically significant, indicating that they
behave less consensually when the unpopularity of the incumbent government
is high, this being especially true of IU. As for the PNV, the coefficient is not stat-
istically significant because of the high percentage of abstentions recorded by this
group in votes concerning policies adopted by the Rajoy government.
Figure 7: Mean Percentage of Positive Votes, Negative Votes and Abstentions of the PP to Socio-
economic Legislation
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In the case of EU-related measures, the results show that the index of consen-
sus declines when legislation is of this nature; and while the coefficient is not stat-
istically significant, its negative sign suggests that the economic crisis may have
reduced the incentives for Spanish parliamentary groups to cooperate on EU-
related affairs. It might be the case that the crisis has undermined the output-
based legitimacy that has historically explained the support from public
opinion and the political parties in Spain for European integration. As Jones
(2009) argues, the crisis has sapped support for the euro, undermined trust in
EU institutions, especially the European Central Bank, and in so doing, it has
also exposed a weakness in the output-oriented legitimacy of the EU. In this
sense the crisis would appear to have significantly affected one of the pillars
that has traditionally upheld support for European integration in Spain: economic
growth and a reduction of the difference in living standards between Spain and
the rest of Europe (Dı´ez Medrano, 2007).
As a result, some political parties, especially those to the left (for example, the
IU), which were already critical of the social consequences of the Maastricht
Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty, have started to express serious concerns
about the turn of events in specific EU policy areas. As Figure 8 illustrates, IU
is the parliamentary group that expresses greatest opposition to EU-related legis-
lation, especially to measures tackling socio-economic issues. Other parties simi-
larly oppose EU-related legislation, but they adopt different strategies over time.
When the PP and the PSOE are in power, these two parties never oppose EU-
related socio-economic legislation. However, when they are in opposition, they
adopt a completely distinct voting behaviour. In the case of the PSOE, during
the Rajoy government the mean percentage of negative votes increased to 55
Figure 8: Mean Percentage of Negative Votes to Legislation With and Without EU Content by
Political Party (2001–12)
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per cent. In the case of the PP, on the other hand, when in opposition, and
especially during Zapatero’s last legislature, the party opposition to EU-related
legislation was lower (27 per cent of negative votes) and, as outlined above,
adopted a strategy based primarily on abstention. In the case of IU, its opposition
to this type of legislation has always been high, presenting a mean percentage of
negative votes that has consistently been above 50 per cent during both Zapa-
tero’s last legislature and the first two years of the Rajoy government.
Overall, and as a direct result of the economic crisis, Spanish parties, and
especially those to the left, have not called into question Spanish membership
of the EU, but they now have additional incentives to pay attention to EU
affairs as a means of demonstrating their disagreement with EU decisions and
also of responding to shifting public opinion perceptions of European integration.
According to a recent poll, Spanish citizens are increasingly distancing them-
selves from national institutions and at the same time becoming more critical
of EU institutions. A large majority of Spaniards (86 per cent) think that if EU
institutions continue to implement the policies that have been developed to
manage the crisis, the EU will no longer be ‘useful’. Moreover, 84 per cent
believe that the EU’s economic policies respond more to German interests than
they do to those of other countries, and 94 per cent consider it necessary to
reform EU institutions (CIS Barometer, 2013).
Conclusions
The economic crisis has contributed significantly to the reduction in the level of
consensus between government and opposition in Spain. Indeed, the consensus
index has fallen since the outbreak of the crisis during Zapatero’s second legis-
lature (2008–11), and the level is now particularly low under Mariano Rajoy’s
government (2011–12). This dynamic is partly explained by the rising amount
of legislation with socio-economic content introduced to tackle the crisis;
however, the type of government should also be taken into account to understand
patterns of conflict and cooperation. The results reported here illustrate that con-
sensus increases when the incumbent is in need of the support of opposition
parties to pass legislation. Opposition support for legislation was higher during
the minority governments of Zapatero than it was during the absolute majority
enjoyed by Aznar, and is now especially low following the absolute majority
won by Rajoy.
The opposition’s voting behaviour has also been more adversarial following
the outbreak of the crisis because the measures adopted to tackle it have resulted
in a marked decline in the popularity of the incumbents. The results illustrate that
as the popularity of the government falls the opposition tends to behave less con-
sensually because the possibilities of winning office or improving electoral per-
formance increase. Overall, it seems that the opposition opts for a strategy based
on conflict so as to weaken the government rather than for a strategy based on
cooperation. The rise in the mean percentage of negative votes in all
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parliamentary groups during the Rajoy legislature or the strategic use of absten-
tion by the PP during Zapatero’s last legislature serves to corroborate that
problem-solving strategies do not drive politics under the pressure of economic
collapse and debt crisis.
Finally, the results illustrate that government–opposition dynamics are influ-
enced by the context of multilevel governance in which many decisions to
manage the crisis are taken. Although there are no Eurosceptic parties in
Spain’s political system, opposition to legislation with EU content has been
high during the period of analysis, especially in relation to socio-economic
measures and among parties to the left. Economic decline has increased the
incentives of opposition parliamentary groups to oppose EU-related legislation
as an indication of their disagreement with EU decisions but also to respond to
shifting public opinion perceptions of European integration.
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Notes
1. Full names of all abbreviated parties in the text are the following: PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero
Espan˜ol; PP, Partido Popular; CIU, Converge`ncia i Unio´; PNV, Partido Nacionalista Vasco; ERC,
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; IU, Izquierda Unida; CC, Coalicio´n Canaria; UPyD, Unio´n
Progreso y Democracia.
2. The legislative databases created by the Spanish Policy Agendas Project have been coded manually
by two coders in accordance with the methodology applied by the Comparative Agendas Project,
which identifies 19 major legislative fields and 247 subcategories (Chaque´s-Bonafont, Palau, &
Baumgartner, forthcoming).
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3. Information about the total number of votes cast (positive, negative, absences and abstentions) is
provided for all the decree-laws and organic laws. However, information about the voting behav-
iour of each parliamentary group is missing in the case of 15 decree-laws and eight organic laws.
4. Subcategory 1523 (natural disasters and accidents) is not considered in topic 15 as it is not directly
related to economic and social issues.
5. Although the impact of the economic and fiscal crises is analysed here, the regression model does
not specifically include a variable to operationalise the variable ‘crisis’ by considering, for
example, unemployment rates or changes in GDP, because this variable was found to be highly
correlated with government popularity and therefore introduced serious multicollinearity into
the model.
6. No previous analysis of consensus has been undertaken for decree-laws. Mu´jica and Sa´nchez
Cuenca (2006) considered only organic laws and so it is not possible to compare these results
with the situation prior to 2001.
7. The Durbin–Watson test indicates that there is no autocorrelation, the variance inflation factor
(VIF) and tolerance test that there is no multicollinearity and the Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg
test that there is no heteroskedasticity in the regression models.
8. The regression equations that consider the differences between the PP and the PSOE when in office
and when in opposition do not take into account the difference in the number of seats. In the case of
the PP, this is because when the PP was in opposition the PSOE was always a minority government
and the PP always governed with an absolute majority; in the case of the PSOE, this is because this
variable is highly correlated with the variable measuring changes in the popularity of government,
which introduces a serious multicollinearity problem in the regression.
9. Unlike other countries, such as Norway, Spanish parliamentary rules do not allow representatives
to vote either in favour or against legislation (Rasch, 1995). However, there is no single way of
interpreting the meaning of such an abstention. For example, its effects are strongly related to
the type of government. When the governing party has an absolute majority, abstention cannot
prevent the adoption of legislation, but when there is a minority government, abstention may
mean that the governing party does not satisfy the quorum required to pass legislation and, there-
fore, depending on the position taken by other parliamentary groups, it may have a veto effect.
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